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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
EVIDENCE: DECLARATIONS AGAINST A
PENAL INTEREST-A PLEA FOR PARITY
The rules of evidence in the main are based on ex-
perience, logic, and common sense ....
With these words Justice Holmes lodged a protest against
the inconsistency of the rule of evidence that admits dec-
larations against a pecuniary or proprietary interest, but ex-
cludes a declaration against a penal interest.
Holmes is not alone in the protest against the inherent
absurdity of this rule, but is in the company of such giants
of the legal profession as Professors Wigmore 2 and McCor-
mick,3 and Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court.4 In addition, the American Law Instituter and the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws6 have recommended that
the declaration against a penal interest be put on parity with
the declaration against a proprietary or pecuniary interest.7
However, neither the opinions of great legal minds nor the
'Donnelly v. United States, 223 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).2 See 5 J. WIGmORE, EviDENcE §§ 1476-77 (3d ed. 1940).
3 See C. McCoumIcK, EVIDENCE 549-53 (1954).
4 People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr.
841 (1964) (declaration against a penal interest is admissi-
ble).
5 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509 (1942) which provides:
(1) A declaration is against the interest of a declarant
if the judge finds that the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time of the declaration so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far sub-
jected him to civil or criminal liability ... that a reason-
able man in his position would not have made the declara-
tion unless he believed it to be true.
(2) ... [E]vidence of so much of a hearsay declaration
is admissible as consists of a declaration against interest
.... (Emphasis added).
6 See UmFo~mv RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(10).
7The declaration against a pecuniary or proprietary interest
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recommendations of model codes are enough to support the
premise that declarations against a penal interest should be
admissible into evidence. Rather, one must look to logic, his-
tory, and application of the rule of evidence concerning dec-
larations against interest before an intelligent decision can
be made. In order to accomplish this goal it would be judicious
to look to both the development and current status of the
majority and minority rule regarding a declaration against
a penal interest.
The majority rule excluding such hearsay declarations
was first expressed in England by the House of Lords in 1844
in the Sussex Peerage case.8 The holding in this case limit-
ed admissible declarations against interest to those which af-
fected a proprietary or pecuniary interest. The United States
Supreme Court adopted the rule in 1913,10 and since then it
has become the rule in most United States jurisdictions.1
The rationale behind the adoption of the majority rule
rests on fear of perjury or fraud. This fear was expressed
quite well by the Maryland Court of Appeals.'2 The court
stated:
It is not difficult to see the abuses to which the gen-
eral admission of such testimony might lead. Every one
is admissible in all jurisdictions. 5 J. WiMoRE, EviDENcE §
1476 (3d ed. 1940). However, the majority rule as to dec-
larations a penal interest is that such statements are in-
admissible. 5 J. WIGMOpE, supra.
8 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H. L. 1844).
9 For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the majority
rule, see Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43, 45 (1946).
10 Donnelly v. United States, 223 U.S. 243 (1913).
" E.g., Wesson v. State, 238 Ala. 399, 191 So. 249 (1939); Tomp-
kins v. Fonda Glove Lining Co., 188 N.Y. 261, 80 N.E. 933,
148 N.Y.S. 570 (1907); Flemming v. State, 95 Vt. 154, 113 A.
783 (1921). For a general discussion of the majority rule as
it applies to all jurisdictions, see 5 J. WiGmORE, EViDENcE §
1476 n.9 (3d ed. 1940).
12 Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148 (1926).
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accused of crime would be tempted to introduce perjured
statements of some third person, then beyond the juris-
diction of the court, admitting that such third person and
not the defendant had committed the crime in question,
and the experience of the court renders it certain that
many would yield to such a temptation. 13
This fear has been coupled with the warning of Chief
Justice Marshall that:
The danger of admitting hearsay evidence is sufficient
to admonish courts of justice against lightly yielding to
the introduction of fresh exceptions to an old and well
established rule, the value of which is felt and acknowl-
edged by all .... 14
The result has been a reluctance to depart from the ma-
jority rule. To further understand this reluctance one must
look to the reason for admitting any hearsay statement.
The fundamental rationale of a declaration against in-
terest is the same as for any exception to the hearsay rule,
that is, under the particular circumstances t h e statement
is trustworthy and the declarant is unavailable for testimony,
thereby creating a necessity of resorting to second hand testi-
mony.15 As stated by Dean Wigmore:
The basis of the Exception [sic] is the principle of experi-
ence that a statement asserting a fact distinctly against
one's interest is unlikely to be deliberately false or heed-
lessly incorrect, and is thus sufficiently sanctioned, though
oath and cross-examination are wanting.'
'1 134 A. at 150. It should be noted at this point that the great
majority of cases on declarations against a penal interest
concern extrajudicial confessions in criminal cases. The ques-
tion has arisen in a few reported civil cases and the dis-
tinction, if any, will be touched upon later in this article.
14 Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 290 (1813) in which
Chief Justice Marshall was discussing the hearsay rule in
general.
'5 5 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1457 (3d ed. 1940).
1 Id.
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As stated before, the courts have generally held that only
a pecuniary or propietary interest in the declarant will suf-
fice for this exception.' 7 The declaration against a penal in-
terest, according to the rationale of the majority, does not, per
se, have the requisite quality of trustworthiness surrounding
it and therefore all such statements should be excluded from
evidence. The courts are, in effect, holding that at no time is
a declaration against a penal interest harmful and therefore
there can be no assumption of trustworthiness. It is as if the
courts would rather take the easier course of total exclusion
than to attempt to define those conditions giving rise to the
presumption of trustworthiness.
Fortunately not all jurisdictions have taken this ostrich-
like approach. Instead a small minority of courts have either
defined those circumstances under which this declaration will
be admitted 18 or have put this declaration on parity with a
declaration against a pecuniary or proprietary interest, that
is, admissible because of its very nature.' 9 In order to gain
an insight into the logic of the minority's holdings it would
be advisible to briefly look at these holdings.
The first exception to the majority rule was Hines v.
Commonw.ealth.2 1 In this case the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a confession by a third party is admissible when
17 See note 7 supra.
18 E.g., People v. Lettich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952);
Cameron v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 29, 217 S.W.2d 23 (1949);
Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
19 Deike v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 3 Ariz. 430, 415 P.2d 145
(1966); People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36
Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189
S.W.2d 284 (1945); Band Refuse Removal v. Fair Lawn, 62
N.J. Super. 552, 163 A.2d 465 (App. div. 1960).
20 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
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there are other facts which tend to support that confession.2 1
The court also stated that the declarant must be unavailable
for testimony before the admissibility of the statement will
be considered. This exception of the extrajudicial confession
coupled with substantiative evidence, though limiting by its
nature, nevertheless has found acceptance in a few jurisdic-
tions in one form or another.
Those jurisdictions which have departed from the ma-
jority rule have done so only under limiting circumstances.
For example, where the prosecution is relying solely upon
the repudiated confession of the defendant and that confession
does not conform to the known facts;22 where there are un-
usual circumstances surrounding the case and there are ex-
istant safeguards against perjury and fraud;2 and where the
evidence is purely circumstantial and there are other facts
tending to show the third party's guilt.24 It can be seen from
the foregoing that only under the most special of circumstances
will some courts relax the majority rule. There, however, has
been a small crack in the dike of resistance to change.
The first jurisdiction to make what appears to be a com-
plete break with the majority rule was Missouri in the case
of Sutter v. Easterly.25 In this case the Supreme Court of
21 The court also stated:
[W]e are disposed to think that the evidence of even a
bare confession by a deceased or unavailable witness ought
to go to the jury for what it is worth; but as our decision
here must be regarded as out of line with the current of
authority, we will expressly limit its effect as a precedent
in this court to the particular facts of the case in hand.
117 S.E. at 848 (emphasis added).
It is indeed unfortunate that the court lacked the strength
of its convictions.
22People v. Lettich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488, 491-92 (1952).
2 Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148 (1926).
24Cameron v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 29, 217 S.W.2d 23 (1949).
25 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945).
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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Missouri was faced with the affidavit of a witness in a prior
damage suit who now swore that he had conspired with the
plaintiff's lawyer in that action to commit perjury and there-
fore, that the judgment had been obtained through fraud. In
this equitable action to set aside the judgment the question
before the court was whether the affidavit was admissible
since the affiant was unavailable because of his refusal to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination. The court first held
that the affiant was unavailable in the legal sense, thereby
qualifying the affidavit under the declaration against interest
exception to the hearsay rule. The court then looked to wheth-
er this declaration was one which would qualify under that
exception. In holding that the affidavit was admissible as a
declaration against a penal interest, the court firmly rejected
the majority concept of limiting declarations against interest
to pecuniary or proprietary interests. Instead the court rec-
ognized that a declaration against a penal interest was of such
character as to be "against one's interest" and "unlikely to
be either deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect" 26 because
of the possibility of resulting criminal implication. This view,
however, has been somewhat tempered by the holding of this
same court in State v. Brown2 7 wherein it was held that the
rule of Sutter was not applicable in criminal cases. The court
stated that the facts in this case did not come up to the rule
expressed in Sutter because the defendant had not shown the
unavailibility of the declarant. In addition the court noted
that the general rule in criminal cases is that declarations
against a penal interest are inadmissible. This distinction be-
tween civil and criminal cases though difficult to understand
does merit examination.
The Sutter case is one of two civil cases that have put
the declaration against a penal interest on parity with a dec-
26 189 S.W.2d at 290.
404 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. 1966).
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laration against a pecuniary or proprietary interest.28 In the
few remaining civil cases where such declarations have been
admitted, it has been accepted on some basis other than their
penal character.29 Instead the courts have looked to the ef-
fect that such statements would have on the declarant's pe-
cuniary or proprietary interest. If any effect could be found
the statement would be held admissible.30 Obviously the courts
involved do not accept the logic of admitting the declara-
tion against a penal interest and therefore feel it necessary
to characterize such declarations as something else. There-
fore, with the exception of Missouri and New Jersey, the
courts have strongly adhered to the majority's position re-
gardless of whether the declaration arose in a criminal or
civil case.
As a result the only possible explanation of the holding
in the Sutter case is found in the nature of the facts in the
case. Here was a judgment procured by fraud which could
be proved only by the admission into evidence of the affidavit
of the witness who committed the perjury. Therefore the
court found a convenient way to overturn the judgment by
adopting the view of a small minority. However, when the
Sutter case was cited to this same court in a criminal case,
the distinction was made that such declarations are not ad-
missible in criminal prosecutions because of the general rule
2 8 The other civil case is Band Refuse Removal v. Fair Lawn,
62 N.J. Super. 552, 163 A.2d 465 (App. div. 1960). There is
also authority for stating that Arizona would admit such
declarations in civil cases, although in the only case report-
ed a declaration was not admitted because it was not truly
a declaration against interest. Deike v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.,
3 Ariz. 430, 415 P.2d 145 (1966).
29 See Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W.
852 (1915), where a declaration that the declarant had un-
bolted the rail, thereby causing drailment of the train, was
held admissible.
80 Id.
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against the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions.3 ' It ap-
pears that this distinction arose as a rule of convenience and
therefore would not necessarily be valid in other jurisdic-
tions. In fact, when tested in the light of logic, if a situation
exists where one is placing himself in a position to be crimi-
nally prosecuted because of remarks alluding to crimes he
may have committed, it is ludicrous to assume that the trust-
worthiness of the statement is to be judged by the type of
action in which the litigants are engaged. If it is trustworthy
enough to merit introduction into evidence in civil cases,
then it should be trustworthy enough for criminal cases.
To date California has been the only jurisdiction that
has made a complete break with the majority in criminal
cases. In People v. Spiggs,32 the defendant was charged with
illegal possession of narcotics. At the time of his arrest a
female companion stated that the narcotics were hers. When
the arresting officer was asked about this statement on cross
examination, the answer was excluded as hearsay. On ap-
peal the California Supreme Court reversed the verdict of
guilty, establishing the precedent that declarations against
a penal interest are, per se, admissible.
In the short time since this case was handed down, it
has become the leading case in the battle of the minority to
become the majority. This can be attributed to the forceful
opinion in which Chief Justice Traynor pointed out the fal-
lacy of assuming that declarations against a penal interest
are any less trustworthy than declarations against a pro-
prietary or pecuniary interest: "A person's interest against
being criminally implicated gives reasonable assurance of the
veracity of his statement made against that interest".33 Hence,
we have for the first time a recognition by a court of the
31 This same distinction has been made in New Jersey. State
v. Sejuelas, 94 N.J. Super. 576, 229 A.2d 659 (App. div. 1967).
32 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964).
33 389 P.2d at 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
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trustworthiness, per se, of a declaration against a penal in-
terest.
34
The holding in the Sprigg's case is the first common sense
approach to the problem to appear. Although it is late in ar-
riving, it no doubt will be accepted in many other jurisdic-
tions as the question arises. For this reason, the author would
like to suggest the approach to be taken in Oklahoma should
the question come before our courts. However, before this
suggestion is made, we should look to the law in Oklahoma
regarding declarations against interest.
The rule in Oklahoma is squarely aligned with the ma-
jority. In criminal cases as well as civil, a declaration against
a penal interest is clearly inadmissible.35 The reason f or
adopting the majority rule was well expressed by the Court
of Criminal Appeals when it stated:
If evidence of this kind was admissible as original
testimony for a defendant, it would be impossible to con-
vict any thief, because he could always find witnesses
who would testify that they heard some one who was ab-
sent confess to being guilty of the crime. To hold that
such evidence was competent would put a premium on
fraud, make perjury safe and place the state at the mercy
of criminals. This would make a mockery of the law, and
will not be permitted in the courts of Oklahoma.36
34 The Spriggs case is also unique in that Justice Traynor al-
so held that the availability of the witness was immaterial
in determining the admissibility of a declaration against in-
terest. This has the effect of eliminating the necessity factor
and leaving the reliability factor as the only element to be
considered in the determination of the admissibility of such
evidence. To date this is the only case that has so held.85 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452
(1937); In re Wininger's Petition, 337 P.2d 445 (Okla. Crim.
1959); Newton v. State, 61 Okla. Crim. 237, 71 P.2d 122
(1937); Dykes v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. 602 150 P. 84 (1914);
Davis v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 515, 128 P. 1097, (1913).
"Davis v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 515, 525-26, 128 P. 1097, 1099
(1913).
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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From this rather strong wording it is obvious that the
majority rule of nonadmissibility of declarations against a
penal interest is well entrenched in Oklahoma. Equally well
entrenched is the rule that only declarations against a pe-
cuniary or proprietary interest will be admitted. This rule
evolved from the rather unique case of Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Strauch 7 a case which deserves some close scrutiny
in the search for a logical rule in Oklahoma.
In this case one Claude Oliver plotted with a friend to
find an eligible girl, marry her, take out a life insurance
policy on her life, then murder her and subsequently split
the proceeds with his confederate, who would help with the
murder. Oliver and his friend carried out this plan and the
result was not money but the electric chair for both. How-
ever, before Oliver took out the policy on his new bride's
life, he confided to another the nefarious scheme into which
he was about to enter. As a result, when the heirs of Mrs.
Oliver sued the insurance company for the proceeds of the
policy, an attempt was made by Aetna Life to put into evi-
dence this statement by Oliver in order to prove that the
policy was obtained by fraud, thereby relieving the company
of any liability. In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the statement should
have been admitted as a declaration against interest. In so
ruling the court established a guideline as to the admissi-
bility of such statements. In essence this guideline provides
that:
1. the declarant must be unavailable as a witness, us-
ually by reason of death;
2. it must appear that the declaration or statement re-
lated a fact against the apparent or prima facie pecu-
niary or proprietary interest of the declarant at the
time it was made;
37 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452 (1937).
8s Id.
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3. the declaration must have concerned a fact personally
cognizable by the declarant; and
4. the circumstances must render it improbable that a
motive to falsify existed.A8
In applying these standards the court found that the
statement was a declaration against a pecuniary interest be-
cause Oliver could have lost the $5,000.00 proceeds of the
policy had the statement been made known to the insurance
company. Therefore, reasoned the court, the statement should
have been admitted. It is interesting to note t h e court's
failure to allow the statement into evidence because of its
penal quality. Certainly the fact that Oliver could have been
electrocuted for his part in the crime would make the state-
ment just as trustworthy as the fact that he stood to lose
$5,000.00. However, the court admitted the statement into
evidence only for its pecuniary quality and failed to con-
sider its penal quality at all.
The standards as announced in the Strauch c a s e still
stand as the law in Oklahoma today. There has been, how-
ever, an indication from one of the Justices of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, that the majority rule does not
meet with favor from all who sit on the bench. In the case
of In Re Wininger's Petition"9 a sharply worded dissent to the
decision upholding the rule as expressed in Strauch was filed.
Because this dissent is both well written and expresses an
inescapable logic, it deserves examination.
In this case the court at first reversed Wininger's con-
viction on the grounds that a confession by another should
be admissible. However, this ruling was overturned when it
was pointed out on rehearing that Oklahoma has long fol-
lowed the rule of excluding such statements. It was to this
ruling rehearing that the dissent pointed out the fallacy of
including declarations against a pecuniary or proprietary on
39 337 P.2d 445 (Okla. Crim. 1959.)
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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the one hand and excluding declarations against a penal in-
terest on the other. In commenting on this fallacy it was
stated:
. . . How could it be said that one involved in crime
could possibly attach more importance to his monetary
assets than he would to his liberty or pursuit of happi-
ness. . . It is going far afield to say that, whereas
mankind holds property on such high regard that a state-
ment to the detriment of his title and interest therein
will be taken as true and a statement which could for-
ever deprive him of his liberty is false, . . . [T]his is
especially unjustifiable in the light of common knowl-
edge that the individual, instead of having a higher regard
for property than for life and liberty, will, when accused
of crime, exhaust his entire material wealth to secure
liberty, life, and vindication. °
The erroneous assumption that one's liberty is not dear
enough to him to protect it at all costs forms the basis for
the conclusion that the majority rule excluding declarations
against a penal interest is without merit. This is a conclusion
which has been reached by one of the three judges who
make up the Court of Criminal Appeals. One can only hope
that it will not be much longer before at least one more sees
the wisdom of what was said in the dissent.
These observations illustrate t h e absurdity of failing
to put declarations against a penal interest on parity with
declarations against .a pecuniary or proprietary interest
It is illogical to exclude t h e s e declarations because of
an alleged lack of trustworthiness. Obviously, the very
nature of the statement is so harmful to the declarant that
a presumption of truthfulness is the only determination that
can flow from its utterance. Furthermore, the danger of per-
jury complained of by the majority is no more real than in
any other exception to the hearsay rule. In addition, the
danger that the witness relating the statement will commit
40 Id. at 454.
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perjury is no greater here than in any other trial situation.
For the foregoing reasons the author recommends that
Oklahoma abandon the rule that declarations against a penal
interest are inadmissible and replace it with the rule that dec-
larations against a penal interest are, per se, admissible. It
would be self-defeating to adopt anything else. To adopt a
rule whereby such declarations are admissible only under
special circumstances would in effect refute the assumption
of trustworthiness. If there are circumstances which shadow
a statement's credibility, they should go to weight rather
than admissibility. If the situation exists where the declarant
has nothing to lose by confessing to the crime, then this fact
can be pointed out to the jury. This method is surely more
desirable than foreclosing the possibility of allowing into evi-
dence such declarations in all but a few limiting cases. Furth-
ermore, our system of justice with its inherent safeguards
for the individual is at odds with a rule of evidence that
prevents a defendant from clearing himself of criminal charg-
es when perfectly trustworthy evidence is available for that
purpose. It is obviously more desirable to allow into evidence
such statements and permit the jury to weigh their signifi-
cance in the light of the surrounding circumstances, than to
summarily exclude them from evidence because of an alleged
lack of trustworthiness.
It is with these thoughts in mind that the author urges
the courts of Oklahoma to admit into evidence declarations
against a penal interest and thereby place Oklahoma in the
forefront of jurisdictions that have abandoned the untenet-
able position of the majority rule.
Lance Stockwell
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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